What we claim, and how sure we are

Aotearoa New Zealand · © John Stroh

Version 0.4 · revised 13 September 2026 · this version as a PDF

Everything this work asserts, with a grade on each: what follows from standard results, what is stated precisely enough to be tested but is not proved here, and what is an open question we have not answered. Every claim says what would show it to be wrong.

Claims register · Version 0.4 · September 2026


The claim#

If the only copy of what your AI systems did is the one you hold, nobody outside your company can check it.

An organisation running AI agents can meet every record-keeping duty in force and still be unable to show anybody else what its agents did. The instruments that change that have been standard for twenty-five years, and we have not found them in use for this purpose. This work sets out what using them takes: built, measured once, and written up as a draft standard with its unsettled questions listed.

How to read the grades#

Grade Means
Established Follows from standard results. No novelty is claimed; the contribution is the composition.
Conjectured Stated precisely enough to be tested. Not proved here.
Open A question this work poses and does not answer.

A claim that depends on a conjecture cannot itself be established. E5 is absent from the established list below for that reason: it was reclassified as C4 on 12 September 2026.

What is established#

Claim What would show it wrong
E1 The substrate is a filtration: the past is annotatable, never editable, and a detector at any moment sees everything sealed before it. A construction that alters a sealed record without breaking the chain.
E2 Commit-and-reveal inherits its unpredictability from the external clock alone. Without one, the committing party controls the order and the proof collapses. A commitment scheme that is unpredictable to its own author without an outside time source.
E3 The batch interval Δ is a parameter of the evidence, not of cost. Every statistic carries an attestation grade. Showing that events inside one batch can be independently ordered.
E4 The null-source trichotomy — learned, authored, randomised — is exhaustive for detectors whose inputs are the sealed history, the mandate and the seed. A fourth kind of null model built from those inputs.
E6 A single fixed examination configuration can be driven towards zero detection by an adversary who can identify it. A mixture over a closed set has a floor. A fixed configuration with a floor, or a mixture without one.
E7 Deriving a separate stream per component gives independence to an observer and joint reproducibility to an auditor. Recovering one component’s stream from another’s observed behaviour.
E8 Among point processes of a given rate, homogeneous Poisson timing is the maximum-entropy choice: an observer learns least from it. A timing distribution at the same rate from which an observer can infer more about the active configuration.

What is conjectured#

Claim What would settle it
C1 A learned null’s detection power degrades at least linearly in the fraction of history that is already compromised. Proof or refutation for a specific estimator.
C2 The eight pattern types span the patterns definable over the substrate with first-order statistics on labels. A pattern outside the basis. This is the load-bearing conjecture; C4 rests on it.
C3 At governance scale a near-uniform mixture is within a small constant of the optimal one. Computing the optimum for a real rule set.
C4 The residual — what no detector can see — is exactly the set of acts the written authority permits, which is to say mandate error. Downgraded from established, 12 September 2026. The identity holds only if C2 does. What is not in question is the weaker half — no detector flags an act the written authority permits, because there is nothing to flag against. Whether that set is exactly the residual depends on C2.

What is open#

Question
O1 Compute the detection floor for a concrete rule set and adversary class. It is a number rather than a principle, and we have not produced one.
O2 Quantify what the content of released findings leaks about the active configuration.
O3 The practical cost of spreading a small examination budget across detectors.
O4 Whether C2 holds. If it does not, the basis needs extending and C4 goes with it.
O5 The recognition rate enters the detection probability multiplicatively and is unmodelled in the formal work.
OQ-15 What does any of this detect when an agent has no owner? Recorded 12 September 2026. The external clock and the unpredictable seed survive an ownerless agent. Sealer isolation survives only where there is an estate to run one. The fourth — a written authority somebody answers for — does not exist, and with no mandate the residual is everything.

The one measurement, what it shows and what it does not establish#

Recognition rate q: the probability that a reviewer handed a record containing an improper act says so. It matters because sampling and recognition multiply — the chance of missing all n improper acts is (1 − s·q)^n for sampled share s, so a perfect sampling regime staffed by reviewers who do not recognise what they see catches almost nothing.

Measured once: 100, 92 and 58 per cent across three levels of disguise, with no false alarms in thirty-six judgements on clean records. The records, both answer keys and the scoring code are published as a bundle.

It does not establish a threshold. The reviewers were machine reviewers; human recognition is unmeasured, and that is the largest open item in this work. Twenty-five units, with five planted breaches at the blatant level and four at each of the others after withdrawal, gives a magnitude — that recognition is neither near one nor near zero — and nothing more. The units are synthetic.

Two units planted as breaches were withdrawn during scoring. All three reviewers rejected them independently; on examination the units did not contain what the key said they contained. That moved two figures up, from 73 and 47 per cent. Both keys are in the bundle, so the correction can be checked.

The standard is a draft and says so#

MIO-STD-01 is published at working-draft status. Its clause 9 lists what must be settled before it could be submitted anywhere:

  1. q has been measured once, for model readers only — not enough to set a threshold.
  2. The exhaustiveness conjecture (C2) is open.
  3. The delta over PeerReview must be stated precisely.
  4. No attestation authority is named, and the standing of a foreign one is unexamined.
  5. The intellectual-property declaration differs between standards regimes.
  6. Alignment with ISO/IEC 24970 is unexamined.

What is running, and what is not#

An implementation of this standard runs in production. Its position against the standard is set out below in both directions. Each row was checked against the running code and the live service on 12 September 2026 by an AI agent working to the author’s instruction, not by an independent party. The rows on time attestation were re-checked against the code on 15 September 2026, the same way, and corrected: this page had reported the receipt attestation as undeployed after it had been deployed. For the four mechanisms this table grades — sovereign, signed, sealed, timestamped — set out together with their limits, see the record.

What is running.

The Governance API is live Sealed records, segments, sealing and receipt verification, under scope-based authentication, at mysovereignty.digital. A design partner has called it.
Every record is hashed at emission and chained Across thirty-eight record types, with a per-tenant Ed25519 signature over a canonical payload.
Receipts are signed fail-closed A receipt is never issued unsigned, and never without an explicit, signed label naming which authority reached the verdict. That label is about the decision, not about the time.
Records are anchored to an outside authority, on a daily sweep The sweep submits record digests to an RFC 3161 authority and stores the returned token whole, with its certificate chain, so a third party verifies it with openssl ts -verify and never has to contact us. For records it runs after the fact; for receipts it is the retry path behind the attestation taken at the moment of issue.
A receipt’s time is attested by an outside authority at the moment it is issued Every receipt carries a signed time_attestation block. Before the receipt is signed, its canonical digest is sent to an RFC 3161 authority; the attestation that comes back is folded in beneath the tenant signature, so it cannot be added or altered afterwards — grade A. If the authority does not answer inside the request window, the block records that instead, with the reason, and says so on its face — grade O. ⚠️ A grade-O receipt stays grade O: the block is inside the signature, so the nightly sweep writes a separate anchor on our side and the receipt in a holder’s hands is unchanged. The field decided_at remains our own clock and is not the attested time. Committed 12 September 2026; running in production since 14 September. ⚠️ The authority in use is free and not eIDAS-qualified, so what a grade-A receipt carries today is the evidence, not the statutory presumption — see the shortfall below.
A partial inventory of credentials is running Scoped API keys record who minted them, what scopes they carry, when they expire, and when they were revoked or last used; every proof-chain entry records the key, the signer and what evaluated the policy. This establishes which credential acted. It is not the agent inventory the standard requires — see the shortfall below.

What is not. Each is a shortfall against a clause of the standard.

One attestation authority, in Poland, not eIDAS-qualified The standard requires two under distinct jurisdictions. The authority in use is free and carries no statutory presumption; what it supplies today is the evidence rather than the presumption. A qualified authority — ArubaPEC, Italian, eIDAS-qualified — is under contract. On the RECEIPT path its client is deployed behind a switch that is still off: no receipt carries a qualified stamp. Separately, on 15 September 2026 that authority attested the published record set directly — one token, granted under ETSI policy 0.4.0.2023.1.1, published with the records and checkable by anyone (check the record yourself). Two different things, and this page will not let one stand in for the other. Two authorities in two jurisdictions is what the standard asks for, and one of the two is still missing. No qualified service operating under New Zealand law has been found. An approach to one New Zealand provider was drafted on 14 September 2026; the search has begun and has not been described publicly.
The batch interval was chosen for token cost The standard says it is a parameter of the evidence. The implementation does not meet its own standard here, and the interval would have to be reset against the conduct it must attest.
Key custody is undecided The operator holds the sealer, seed, inventory and observer keys. Two routes out are specified — split custody of the seed, or derivation from a source nobody controls — and neither is built.
The inventory does not record lineage or a sealed mandate Scoped keys establish which credential acted. They do not establish which agent instantiated which, under whose written authority, or when that authority expires.
Not every receipt gets its outside stamp, and the ones that do carry no presumption The attestation is attempted on every receipt, inside the request. It is not guaranteed: if the authority does not answer inside the window the receipt is issued grade O — labelled as such on its face, and retried by the nightly sweep, but at that moment its time rests on our word alone. We do not currently publish what proportion of receipts are grade A. That figure is the measure of this claim, and until it is published a reader should assume the weaker case. And a grade-A stamp today comes from a free authority carrying no statutory presumption, so the strongest thing any receipt now proves about its time is evidential, not legal.
The unpredictable examination regime is not running It depends on the seed custody above.

Where to go next#

The argument for why this matters: Cheaper not to look. What catches an agent: What it takes. The evidence: What we know and what we don’t. How to build it: How to build it. The formal statements: Addendum M. The standard: MIO-STD-01.


Drafted with AI assistance, then checked and revised by the author.

Disclaimer

Status of these claims

What this publication does not claim, and what is outstanding against it in the register.

Nothing outstanding in the register. Every claim in this publication has its evidence recorded, and no question against it is parked. That is a statement about this publication on the date shown above, generated from the register rather than asserted, and it will change when the register does.